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Abstract
Purpose: Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) found that US companies have transitioned from 
corporate (or managerial) to agency (or shareholder) logic.  This study examines the institutional 
logic embedded with New Zealand’s discourse on executive remuneration, and how it influences
the decision-making of remuneration committees.  
Design/methodology/approach: Data are collected from 33 semi-structured interviews with 5 
executives, 16 non-executive directors, 7 consultants, and 5 representatives of issuers (who 
produce codes of best practice).  The interviews focused on executive remuneration in New 
Zealand publicly listed companies.  
Findings: Non-executive directors draw on a multitude of rationales to justify or legitimise their 
decisions regarding executive remuneration.  The rationales include: agency, consultant, fairness, 
human resources, market, motivation, pay-for-performance, and responsibility.  However, the 
market rationale dominated the discourse on executive remuneration.  The majority of non-
executive directors, executives, and consultants interviewed argued that one executive’s 
remuneration should be comparable to another executive’s remuneration.  
Research limitations/implications: Both the agency and corporate logics have been institutionalised 
in New Zealand.  However, the dominant remuneration rationales fit with the corporate logic, rather 
than the agency logic.
Practical implications: As the remuneration rationales are taken-for-granted they offer non-
executive directors considerable flexibility in deciding how and how much to remunerate 
executives. Shareholders and regulators need to be aware of this flexibility.
2Originality/value: This study develops and tests a theoretical framework for understanding how 
institutional logics can influence organisational decision-making.
Type: Research paper
Keywords: Executive remuneration; Institutional theory; Discourse analysis
1. Introduction
Pay-for-performance has become a taken-for-granted catchphrase of corporations, shareholders, 
media, and the public, yet academic research in New Zealand (Andjelkovic et al., 2002; 
Gunasekarage and Wilkinson, 2002; Roberts, 2005) and overseas (Rost and Osterloh, 2009; Tosi 
et al., 2000; Devers et al., 2007) has been unable to evidence a statistically and economically 
significant relationship between CEO pay and firm performance over time.  Academic research 
indicates that CEO pay is related to firm size, rather than firm performance.  This lead Bebchuk 
and Fried (2004) to argue that CEOs have too much power over boards of directors and are able to 
set their own remuneration.    
This research investigates New Zealand’s discourse on executive remuneration, particularly the 
institutional logics (and high-order cultural frames) which people use to understand and justify 
organisational decision-making.  Zajac and Westphal (1995, 2004) found that the agency logic 
replaced the corporate logic as the dominant explanation of corporate governance and executive 
remuneration among US corporations in the mid-1980s.  However, they did not investigate 
alternative remuneration rationales such as pay-for-performance and market, which are 
documented by Wade et al. (1997), St-Onge (2001), and Point and Tyson (2006).  Collectively, 
these studies suggest that isomorphic pressures influence how organisational actors make 
decisions.  Point and Tyson (2006) argues that the language of regulations, codes of practice and 
corporate annual reports are converging.  
Drawing on new institutional sociology, this research examines how organisational actors 
conceptualise and rationalise executive remuneration decisions.  The research questions are: 
3What institutional logics do organisational actors use to understand and make decisions? How do 
these institutional logics influence organisational decision-making?  The remainder of the paper is 
organised as follows: literature review, theoretical framework, research method, findings, 
discussion and conclusion.
2. Literature Review
Institutions are processes and structures which become taken-for-granted by individuals and 
organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Moll et al., 2006).  Institutional theory asserts that 
coercive, normative and mimetic pressure can lead to organisations substantively or symbolically 
adopting the same structures and processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1993; Scott, 2008).  
Regulatory and professional bodies throughout the world have developed codes of practice to 
mandate or recommend how companies should be governed (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; 
Enrione et al.; 2006).  It is taken-for-granted that regulatory and professional bodies should 
produce codes of practice, but the content of these codes varies between countries.  Also, 
companies have implemented similar executive remuneration structures and processes such as 
remuneration committees and variable pay schemes (Chambers, 2005). However, researchers 
have rarely studied how these structures and processes have become take-for-granted.
Institutional logics provide the ideas and meaning that persuades individuals and organisations to 
adopt certain structures and processes (Thorton and Ocasio, 1999).  In an exploratory study, Point 
and Tyson (2006) found that the language of codes of practice and corporate annual reports in 
Europe are similar; the discourse had become institutionalised.  Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) 
argue that there are two institutional logics underpinning corporate governance (see table 1).  The 
agency logic asserts that shareholders should be suspicious of management, whereas the 
corporate logic asserts that shareholders can trust management and using their specialised 
expertise, they can make better decisions than shareholders.  These institutional logics imply that 
different structures and processes are required to govern executives.
4Agency Logic Corporate Logic
Assumptions about: 
- Top Managers 
Fungible agents Knowledgeable stewards 
- The Firm Nexus of contracts Unique institution 
Concept of resource allocation Investor capitalism: Diversified 
investor 
Managerial capitalism: 
Diversified firm 
Links to High-Order Cultural 
Frames 
Logic of capital markets Norm of professional autonomy 
Links to Theories of 
Organisation 
Agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) 
Managerialist theory 
(Chandler, 1962) 
Implications for Governance 
Practices: 
- Compensation Incentives align interests Rewards attract and retain 
- Allocation of cash flow Return excess to investors Retain and reinvest in firm 
Table 1: Institutional Logics and Corporate Governance
(Source: Zajac and Westphal, 2004, p.436)
The agency and corporate logics have different rationales for how executive remuneration should 
be determined.  The agency rationale implies that without variable pay executives would not to act 
in the best interests of shareholders; whereas the human resources rationale (corporate logic)
implies that as long as the level of remuneration is sufficient, executives will act in the best 
interests of the shareholders.  Zajac and Westphal (1995) found that in US companies in the mid-
1980s, the agency rationale replaced the human resources rationale in justifying the adoption of 
long-term incentive plans to shareholders.  However, other remuneration rationales were not 
studied.  Wade et al. (1997) and St-Onge et al. (2001) identified other remuneration rationales 
such as consultant, market, motivation, pay-for-performance, and responsibility (see table 2).  
5Remuneration 
Rationales
Explanations of CEO Pay
Agency
Derived from agency theory, the agency rationale describes how the CEO’s 
interests can be aligned with those of shareholders.
Consultant
Remuneration consultants are used to legitimise the CEO’s pay and 
remuneration practices.
Human 
Resources
Derived from resource dependency theory, the human resources rationale 
asserts that the CEO is a scarce resource and organisations can use 
remuneration to attract and retain scarce managerial talent.
Market
The market rationale argues the CEO’s pay will depend on the market forces of 
supply and demand.
Motivation 
Derived from expectancy theory, the motivation rationale describes that pay can 
be used increase the CEO’s effort/performance.
Pay-for-
Performance
The pay-for-performance rationale argues that to avoid managerial shirking, the 
CEO’s pay should be linked to the firm’s (financial) performance.
Responsibility
Derived from the managerial discretion hypotheses, the responsibility rationale 
states that executive pay rises with their level of responsibility.
Table 2: Remuneration Rationales
Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) argue that agency and corporate logics influence organisational 
decision-making, but did not study whether these rationales are used in the boardroom.  For 
example, boards of directors may want to adopt long-term incentive plans to increase the level of 
executive remuneration, and use remuneration rationales to legitimise their decisions to 
shareholders.  Olsen and March (2006) argue that organisational decision-making is rational 
and/or rule-based.  It may be that boards of directors (and remuneration committees) draw on 
various remuneration rationales in order to make decisions that maximise shareholder value.  
6Alternatively, it may be that boards of directors draw on various remuneration rationales because 
the remuneration rationales confer legitimacy on their decisions.
While the following studies did not examine institutional logic and remuneration rationales, their 
findings do shed light on these theoretical constructs. Bender (2004, and 2007) and Main et al. 
(2008) found that the directors, executives and consultants explained executive remuneration in 
terms which are consistent with the many of the remuneration rationales. Generally, remuneration 
committees aim to pay for performance, while conforming to the expectations of shareholders. 
Further, Perkins and Hendry (2005) found that the market rationale is a key determinant of 
executive remuneration.  Remuneration committees are also concerned with the legitimacy of their 
decisions and use remuneration rationales to avoid criticism (Main et al., 2008; Ogden and 
Watson, 2008).  However, Beer et al. (2003) found that the pay-for-performance and motivation 
rationales are used to justify the use of incentive schemes in order to increase the level of 
executive remuneration, rather than enhance shareholder value.
3. Theoretical Framework
Discourse and action are connected through the decision making of individuals and organisations 
(see figure 1).  Discourse is the realm of ideas and meaning, which is accessed through the 
production and consumption of texts; whereas, action is the realm of structures and processes 
(Phillips et al., 2002).  Institutional logics influence the preferences, capabilities and decision-
making of individuals and organisations.  In making decisions, individuals produce texts, which can 
be temporary or permanent, and carry out actions.  For directors and executives, producing texts 
and carrying out actions are often inseparable. Texts define structures and processes in 
organisations.  As these structures and processes are enacted by individuals and organisations, 
they can become take-for-granted.  Institutions are structures and processes that become self-
reproducing, as they enable and constrain future discourse and action.  Thus, institutions are 
underpinned by institutional logics.  However, individuals and organisations can change or resist 
7institutions and institutional logics if they are powerful or willing to accept a loss in legitimacy, or 
there are conflicting institutions and/or institutional logics (e.g. agency vs. corporate logic).
Discourse
Action
Institutional 
Logics
Institutions
Individual or Organisation
Production of 
texts
Consumption 
of texts
Actions are 
enabled and 
constrained
Actions are 
carried out
Decision 
making 
process
Preferences
Capabilities
Realm of ideas 
and meaning 
Realm of 
structures and 
processes
Figure 1: How discourse and action influence organisational decision-making
Codes of practice are produced by regulatory (e.g. Securities Commission), professional (e.g. 
Institute of Directors) and investor (e.g. Shareholders’ Association) bodies.  Corporate scandals 
have lead to the institutionalisation of codes of practice (Enrione et al., 2006).  Both discourse and 
action is influenced by codes of practice.  The issuers of these codes of practice exert coercive and 
normative pressure on publicly listed companies to conform to their recommendations.  Point and 
Tyson (2006) and Crombie (2009) found that codes of practice and corporate annual reports use 
the same remuneration rationales.  However, these studies did not examine the decision-making of 
boards of directors and remuneration committees.  Mimetic pressure may also be influencing 
8companies to use the same remuneration rationales.  Also, while companies use the remuneration 
rationales to publicly justify their decisions, boards of directors may not use different remuneration 
rationales to privately justify their decisions.  
4. Research Method
The main objective of this research is to test Zajac and Westphal’s (2004) claim that agency logic, 
not corporate logic, dominates organisational decision-making regarding executive remuneration.  
The research questions are: What institutional logics do organisational actors use to understand 
and make decisions? How do these institutional logics influence organisational decision-making?  
A qualitative research method is employed.  Executives and non-executive directors are 
interviewed to understand how boards of directors (and remuneration committees) of publicly listed 
companies determine how and how much to remunerate executives as well as what to disclose to 
the public.  Remuneration consultants are also interviewed as they provide data and advice to non-
executive directors.  Further, representatives of issuers are interviewed as they produce codes of 
practice which shapes the discourse on executive remuneration.
33 individuals were interviewed including 5 executives, 16 non-executive directors, 6 remuneration 
consultants, 1 recruitment consultant, and 5 representatives of issuers.  Several interviewees could 
be included in multiple categories, as of the 16 non-executives directors, 9 are former executives, 2 
are consultants, and 2 are representatives of issuers.  The executives and non-executives 
directors represented 38 companies that are or were listed on the New Zealand Exchange (NZX).  
The non-executive directors have held on average 3 directorships in NZX listed companies, and in 
total several directorships in Australian listed companies. The consultants represented 4 consulting 
firms.  The representatives of issuers represent 3 issuers of codes of practice.  The interviews 
lasted 42.5 hours in total or 77 minutes on average.  The interviewees are not identified in the 
research. Quotes from the interviewees are presented in italics.
9The interviews were semi-structured and conducted in person, on the telephone, or on Skype.  All 
of the interviewees were send an information sheet, a list of general interview topics, and consent 
forms.  Prior to each interview, the interviewee gave verbal or written consent for the interview to 
be recorded.  The interviews covered a range of topics including the principles of remuneration, 
remuneration committees, disclosure in annual reports, annual general meetings, regulations and 
codes of practice, shareholders and analysts, the media’s reporting of executive remuneration, etc.  
While interviewees were asked broadly the same questions, the researcher asked many unscripted 
questions as the interviewees raised points of interest.  The final topic covered in each interview 
was the remuneration rationales, if time allowed.  The researcher described the remuneration 
rationales and then asked for the interviewees’ comments.  Often the interviewees had mentioned 
the remuneration rationales earlier in the interviews, so the interviewees merely stated if they 
agreed or disagreed with each of the remuneration rationales.
Discourse analysis is the study of “the constructive effects of discourse through the structured and 
systematic study of texts” (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p.4).  Discourse analysis is both theory and 
method.  The claims to knowledge of discourse analysis are embedded in the theoretical 
framework (see figure 1), as discourse constructs the social reality of organisations.  The interview 
transcripts are also texts and form part of the discourse on executive remuneration.  Through 
multiple close readings of the texts, the researcher sought to understand how the interviewees 
think about executive remuneration.  The researcher also documented interviewees’ professional 
experience.  Commonalities and differences between the interviewees were identified and 
analysed.  The discourse analysis allowed the researcher to understand what remuneration 
rationales the interviewees used and how the interviewees made decisions.  Also, the researcher 
examined what, if any, institutional logic/s were underpinning the discourse of the interviewees.  
5. Findings
Among New Zealand’s publicly listed companies, the structure of executive remuneration and the 
process by which it is determined is homogenous.  The main components of executive 
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remuneration are salary, short-term incentives (STI) and long-term incentives (LTI).  Salary and 
total remuneration is set in reference to comparable positions in other organisations.  STIs are
based on financial and non-financial performance, and are paid out in cash and shares.  LTIs are 
conditional shares or share rights with vesting periods of three to five years.  Variable components 
of executive remuneration are based on organisational strategy. Remuneration committees gather 
intelligence from consultants and through director networks, and draw on a common set of 
rationales to justify their decisions.  While codes of practice do not influence these decisions, 
regulations and listing rules do influence what is disclosed.  Stakeholders such as shareholders, 
analysts and media act as a constraint on the decision-making of remuneration committees, as 
they do not want to make decisions which are seen as illegitimate or outside the realm of the 
taken-for-granted.  These discourse and actions are mapped in figure 2.
Board of 
Directors / 
Remuneration 
Committee
CEO
Consultants
Other 
firms
Regulators, 
Professions and 
NGOs
Shareholders, 
Media and 
General 
Public
Firm
Reporting Regulations & Codes
Network
Competition
Reporting
Opinions
Data Intelligence
Outcomes
Contract & 
Payment
Discourse
Action
Institutional Logics
Executives 
as agents
Structure (How?): Salary 
+ Short-term Incentives 
+ Long-term Incentives
Processes: Remuneration 
committees; Consultants; 
Negotiation with & evaluation of 
CEO; Shareholder voting
Pay-for-
performance
Institutions
Executives 
as stewards
Money as a 
motivator
Market 
drives 
pay
Non-executive Directors 
& consultants as 
independent judges of pay
Structure (How much?): 
Median-level to upper-
quartile relative to peers
Figure 2: How Executive Remuneration is Determined in New Zealand Publicly Listed 
Companies
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The processes and structures that constitute executive remuneration and the rationales used to 
justify these processes and structures are detailed in table 3.  There are many alternatives within 
these processes and structures, but there is much commonality.  There are many rationales used 
to justify which alternatives are chosen, but there are few rationales.  All non-executive directors 
except one believed that executives should be paid between median and upper-quartile pay 
relative to their peers depending on their level of performance; whereas one non-executive director 
believed that executives should receive lower-quartile pay relative to their peers as executives are 
also driven by non-financial and intrinsic rewards.  However, this non-executive director believed 
that they did not sit on any remuneration committees because their opinion varied from the 
generally accepted or taken-for-granted view.  
The agency and corporate logics are embedded within the discourse on executive remuneration 
and provide the underlying rationale for the existing structures and processes (see table 3).  
Amongst New Zealand companies, a shift from corporate to agency logic is not evident as both 
logics are prominent.  Non-executive directors are both the shareholders’ representatives and the 
executives’ partners.  However, non-executive directors view themselves and executives as 
working together to add shareholder value and knowledge stewards that are entitled to 
professional autonomy.  For example, a non-executive director commented, “Regulators always 
regulate too much, they ask for too much material, too much detail, they totally loose the plot as to 
what really matters…” This sentiment is common among executives and non-executive directors 
and extends to their view of analysts and shareholders as well.  While the agency logic is present 
in the discourse, the corporate logic is dominant.  Non-executive directors and executives share 
similar beliefs and ideas about executive remuneration because non-executive directors tend to be 
either former executives or advisors to executives.  
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Institutions Institutional Logics
Structure (How much to pay?)
- Basic approach, or
- Complex approach (job evaluation 
method)
Non-executive directors and consultants are 
independent judges of CEO pay; They are able 
to objectively determine how much a CEO 
should be paid (agency and corporate logic)
Structure (How to pay?)
- Mix of components
- Salary 
- Short-term incentive (STI) 
- Long-term incentive (LTI)
Rationales embedded with the discourse on 
executive remuneration: Agency logic – Agency, 
market, consultant, pay-for-performance, and 
motivation; Corporate logic – Human resources, 
market, consultant, responsibility, and fairness
Processes – Internal 
- Appointment of a CEO
- Setting a CEO’s remuneration
- Setting a CEO’s targets
- Review an executive’s performance
While non-executive directors are shareholders’ 
representatives (agency logic), they also are 
executives’ partners (corporate logic)
Processes – External 
- Annual report
- Annual general meeting
- Responding to analysts and 
shareholders
- Responding to media and public
While non-executive directors want to disclose 
information to shareholders (agency logic), non-
executive directors also feel that analysts’ and 
shareholders’ demands for information can be 
excessive (corporate logic)
Table 3: Institutional Logics and Institutions
The process by which remuneration committees determine executive remuneration is quite 
homogenous.  One non-executive director summarised the process as follows:
“You’d then decide your strategies ex cetera for the next five years… your 
remuneration would flow out of that… But as you address the remuneration 
issues… you almost have in your mind the pressures, you know, from 
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society, whether they be pressures from politics or the media… And so, you 
know, you end up with a bit of a compromise.”
In setting executive remuneration, there are two processes which remuneration committees 
reconcile. First, there is a process of rational decision-making (Cyert and March, 1992), where 
organisational strategy influence what performance measures, targets and incentives are used.  As 
one CEO commented, “we’ve always got a range of targets that are usually fairly highly aligned 
with our strategic plan’s targets.”  The process that executives and non-executive directors 
described matched those described in management and accounting textbooks (Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 2007; Hanson et al., 2005), and by Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) performance 
management framework.  Second, there is a process of rule-based (or legitimacy-based) decision-
making (March and Olson, 2006), where remuneration committees make decisions, or at least 
disclose decisions in a way, that conforms to stakeholders’ expectations.  Non-executive directors 
believed that the most influential or powerful stakeholders are regulators, analysts and 
shareholders.  For example, one non-executive director remarked that they could not recruit a US 
executive to be CEO because the US executive’s pay expectations were far higher than what 
shareholders would tolerate, so a local candidate was recruited to be CEO.
Non-executive directors have to reconcile what they believe to be a rational choice with what they 
believe to be appropriate (i.e. societal expectations).  The perceptions of executives and non-
executive directors of what is rational are shaped by their experiences and the opinion of their 
peers and consultants.  When discussing how much codes of practice influenced decision-making, 
one non-executive director noted that, “the weight goes on the way I have seen it done… [and] the 
independent consultant, rather than the regulatory body providing tones of opinion.” However, 
some non-executive directors believed that consultants are simply used to legitimise the board’s 
decisions to shareholders. For example, one consultant commented, “The key thing is that people 
require an external validation of remuneration.” Non-executive directors believe that they can
motivate executives to add shareholder value through the use of remuneration schemes that are 
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comparable to their peers; whereas, non-executive directors believe that satisfying the demands of 
shareholders, analysts, regulators, etc is a constraint and does not add shareholder value.
Executives, non-executive directors, consultants, and representatives of issuers use remuneration 
rationales to understand and explain executive remuneration.  These rationales are related to 
agency and corporate logic, and include agency, pay-for-performance, motivation, market, 
consultant, human resources, responsibility, and fairness.  The interviewees used the rationales to 
justify their beliefs and decisions they had made.  For example, when discussing the company’s 
LTI, one CEO argued that, “[it makes] you think like a shareholder so you care about the share 
price. It also aligns your interest in the best terms and the long term with the shareholders.” When 
these rationales were outlined to the interviewees at the end of the interviews, the majority of 
interviewees believed that the rationales represented the principles of executive remuneration.  
This highlights that agency and corporate logics have become taken-for-granted.  However, the 
rationales that are consist with the corporate logic are often prioritised ahead of those consist with 
the agency logic.  The most emphasised rationale is that of the market, as one non-executive 
director expressed, “if you don’t stay competitive then you risk losing your best people”.
The agency rationale (part of the agency logic) states that LTIs such as shares or share rights can 
align the interests of executives with those of shareholders.  Many interviewees used the agency 
rationale during the interview or agreed with it when asked.  For example, when outlining the key 
concepts of executive remuneration at the beginning of the interview, one non-executive director 
stated that, “We really try align to their [executives’] motives, their incentives with the shareholders, 
and those are for long term steady growth and returns…” However, some interviewees believed 
that incentives scheme cannot fully align the interests of executives with those of shareholders 
because executives face no downside risk when performance (or the share price) falls.  Executives 
still receive their salary and often a portion of their STIs even when performance is poor, whereas 
shareholders can lose a significant portion of their wealth.
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The pay-for-performance rationale (part of the agency logic) states that executives’ pay should 
vary with performance.  “The trick is, as I’ve said, how do we define performance?”, as one non-
executive director explained.  Performance is generally defined in financial terms such as revenue
and profit.  The majority of interviewees believed that executives, particularly the CEO, can 
influence firm performance.  However, the main problem is that incentives can work too well, as 
one non-executive director remarked, “People are rational. If you set up performance pay that 
focuses on a narrow definition of success, you will get the behaviour that leads to that outcome”.  
Further, some interviewees believed that economic factors have the most influence firm 
performance, so that executives have to work harder when firm performance is poor and vice 
versa.  These interviewees argued that incentive schemes are profit sharing schemes in disguise.  
Variable pay is linked to performance measures that executives cannot necessarily control 
because shareholders want executives to be held accountable for firm performance. 
The underlying assumption of agency logic is that executives will exert effort when they believe 
doing so will lead to monetary rewards.  This motivation rationale is embedded in the discourse of 
many of the interviewees.  For example, money can motivate executives, as one CEO explained: 
“One year the board decided to give me a double STI; it’s only $50k… it’s 
not enough money to fundamentally alter your level of motivation. Contrast 
that [to a larger company], once I got to the senior rank, the amount of 
money available on STI became very material. One year I got $700k, I 
think. Then there’s no question that sort of amount of money motivates your 
attempts to deliver. No question!”
The interviewees believed that executives have differing motivational profiles.  Some are motivated 
by money and status, whereas others are motivated by the challenge and enjoyment of the job.  
For example, one non-executive director and former CEO believed that the challenge of job 
outweighed the importance of money:
“It’s the puzzle really… Decision-making under uncertainty, and trying to 
get it right… The best CEOs are the ones that are just passionate about 
business… Those who want to be CEO, they’d do the job for half the pay of 
being deputy CEO. Of course you would. The job is so fantastic. You’re 
going to turn it down because of pay? Give us a break.”
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The interviewees believed that executives are motivated by extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, but all 
executives are not motivated by the same factors and to the same degree. Some interviewees 
believed that incentives are used not to motivate executives, but are used by the board of directors 
to justify the level of remuneration to themselves and shareholders.  One CEO explained:
“You are basically saying people will hold back from doing the best job they 
can unless you hang a carrot in front of them. I find that offensive! …The 
remuneration committee and particularly a board would find it hard to pay 
market remuneration if it was fixed… So, to get you to the total you need to 
be competitive, senior executives have an at-risk proportion… [But] I don’t 
think it really changes people’s behaviour.”
The market rationale overshadowed the other rationales.  It is the most emphasised and often the
first rationale to be talked about during the interviews.  When asked about what are the key 
guidelines or principles of remuneration, one non-executive director responded:
“In the end, it is always a trade off between ensuring you retain talent or 
good talent, and not over paying. So there is a temptation if you got a very, 
very strong performer or performers, maybe you start pushing 
boundaries… But I am nervous about really pushing the boundary and 
paying people well beyond the market…”
The market rationale appears to fit with the agency logic, which draws on the higher-order cultural 
frame of capitalism (Friedland and Alford, 1991).  The agency logic argues that markets can 
allocate resources more efficiently than management.  The market rationale states that firms 
compete for managerial talent with other firms, and have to pay competitively.  The market 
rationale assumes that the market for managerial labour is efficient in pricing (or remunerating) a 
CEO.  However, some interviewees disagreed with these assumptions, as one CEO explained:
“In New Zealand, most of your businesses are actually de-facto 
government departments. The idea of a war for talent and needing to 
compete for the best people to run those is actually a load of rubbish… We 
tend to sort of apply that idea that the market rules the pay and you go 
[through] those silly job sizing exercises…”
The market rationale fits better with the corporate logic than the agency logic.  The market for 
managerial labour in New Zealand is controlled by non-executive directors, not shareholders.  
While the corporate logic does not state that non-executive directors and executives will make self-
serving decisions, non-executive directors have a managerial perspective in remunerating 
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executives as they are former executives and advisors to executives.  The non-executive directors 
interviewed believed that only they have the expertise to remunerate executives. Shareholders, 
regulators and the public are not able to remunerate executives because they have not worked as 
executives and do not understand the complexities of the job.  For example, one non-executive 
director remarked that, “if [shareholders] don’t like the CEO’s remuneration package, just sell your 
shares.” These arguments support the corporate logic and managerial capitalism.  
Non-executive directors employ consultants for two reasons: to gain access to intelligence about 
what their peers are paying executives and to legitimise their decisions to shareholders.  The 
consultant rationale states that remuneration consultants can provide an objective, independent 
assessment of executive remuneration.  The majority of publicly listed companies in New Zealand 
and overseas employ remuneration consultants (Conyon et al., 2009; Crombie, 2009; Wade et al., 
1997).  However, interviewees suggested that using remuneration consultants has led to an 
upward pressure on the level of executive remuneration.  One non-executive director explained:
“[Remuneration consultants’] incentive was to bid the whole market up as 
much as you could. So… why did the prize get so big? Who was benefiting 
from the prize? Clearly, the appointed CEO was benefiting, but I suspect 
the hidden agent in all of this is recruitment agencies and remuneration 
consultants.”
The human resources rationale is tightly coupled with the corporate logic.  It states that executives 
are knowledgeable stewards, who can be trusted to make decisions to maximise shareholder value 
without the need for incentives (or coercion).  The vast majority of interviewees shared this view of 
executives. For example, one non-executive director argued:
“Good people are the ones you do not want to lose… [The difference 
between] what a good performer costs to retain and what can actually be 
delivered is just is not even worth spending any time talking about it.”
Although interviewees also acknowledged that some executives are self-serving and do not act in 
the best interests of the company.  For example, one non-executive director described how 
executives in one company put their own interests first: “[The decision] was driven by the Chief 
Executive wanting to, you know, make sure they got their bonuses for that quarter.”    
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The responsibility rationale is also tightly coupled with the corporate logic. It states that 
remuneration should be tied to an executive’s level of responsibility.  Generally, executives in large 
organisations have more complex jobs as they oversee many people, processes and assets.  The 
responsibility rationale explains why firm size and executive remuneration are highly correlated 
(Tosi et al., 2000).  However, some interviewees argued that the positive relationship between firm 
size and executive remuneration is not desirable.  Firm size is not necessarily a proxy for job 
complexity.  There should be a positive relationship between responsibility and executive 
remuneration, but it is difficult to measure responsibility.  Consistent with the corporate logic, non-
executive directors argued that they are the only people able to gauge executives’ level of 
responsibility.  One non-executive director explained:
“[It is a] question of complexity. Often big is seen as the definition that 
drives remuneration and typically there’s correlation between CEO 
remuneration and revenue... The problem is how do you measure 
complexity? …Running a very large but very simple business may actually 
be less demanding and there may be a larger pool of eligible candidates 
than running a somewhat a much more complex business.”
The fairness rationale states that executive remuneration should be fair, reasonable and equitable.  
It is consistent with the corporate logic and duplicates the market rationale because executives, 
non-executive directors, and consultants define fairness in terms of horizontal equity. For example, 
one CEO commented that, “fair and reasonable in my mind would be when there’re no serious 
anomalies in what we… and someone else might be paying for the equivalent similar job.” Vertical 
equity is not a significant concern to remuneration committees.  Additionally, fairness is defined in 
terms of performance, and duplicates the pay-for-performance rationale.  One consultant pointed 
out that, “There are some people saying fair is equal… and others say equitable in terms to [the 
executives’] contribution to the business.” Further, fairness is defined in terms of legitimacy, as 
one non-executive director explained:
“[In determining executive remunerating] you’d say, ‘Well, given our size, 
given our turnover and our earnings growth and stuff like that, are we 
reasonably, fairly positioned?’ And in most cases, we say, ‘Would the 
chairman feel comfortable justifying this to the media or to shareholders at 
an annual meeting or a special meeting or whatever?’ And that’s the test.”
19
Embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration are a multitude of rationales, which are 
taken-for-granted and fit with agency and corporate logics.  While the rationales are taken-for-
granted, the interviewees do challenge the underlying assumptions.  The rationales represent a 
pool of ideas that non-executive directors draw upon in making decisions and give them much 
flexibility.  For example, the comparator group is not defined in the market rationale, performance 
is not defined in the pay-for-performance rationale, and fairness is not defined in the fairness 
rationale.  While non-executive directors do have considerable flexibility in defining these terms 
and, ultimately, determining how and how much the CEO is remunerated, they are constrained by 
societal expectations.  However, what is taken-for-granted is influenced by non-executive directors, 
consultants, shareholders, regulators, the media, etc.  
There are several reasons why non-executive directors draw on the rationales in making decisions.  
First, they may perceive there to be no viable alternatives, as the rationales crowd-in and crowd-
out what is appropriate.  Second, they may believe that certain rationales are true (or lead to better 
outcomes than other rationales).  Third, they may use the rationales to justify decisions that 
produce outcomes they desire, even though they do not believe the rationales are true.  For 
example, the pay-for-performance rationale will be used to justify bonuses to shareholders, even 
though a remuneration committee may believe that incentives do not alter the behaviour of 
executives.  In this way, taken-for-granted rationales can be used to maintain the power or 
legitimacy of executives and non-executive directors.
6. Discussion
Zajac and Westphal (1995, 2004) found that the institutional logic embedded in the discourse of 
US corporations changed from corporate logic to agency logic in the mid-1980s.  Crombie (2009) 
found that amongst the largest 50 publicly listed companies in Australia, New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom that this change is not evident.  Instead, both institutional logics were present in 
the discourse on executive remuneration.  Similarly, this paper’s findings indicate that both 
20
institutional logics are present in the discourse of executives, non-executive directors, consultants, 
and representatives of issuers.  However, the findings also indicate that the corporate logic is more 
prominent than the agency logic.  Non-executive directors believe that they are able to determine 
how best to remunerate executives, and shareholders and regulators should trust them to do this 
task.  Although the agency logic is embedded within the discourse on executive remuneration as 
the vast majority of non-executive directors espoused or agreed with the agency rationale at some 
point during the interviews.    
Crombie (2009) postulated that coercive (e.g. laws) and normative (e.g. codes of practice)
pressure lead public listed companies to adopt remuneration rationales as principles or policies 
within their annual reports.  Note that New Zealand’s codes of practice are voluntary, except the 
NZX’s code but it does not mandate how to remunerate executives. However, the findings of this 
research indicate that executives and non-executive directors are either unaware of the existence 
or contents of the codes of practice, or dismissed the codes of practice as unhelpful.  For example, 
one non-executive director admitted that, “I couldn’t cite you the document, neither of them, to be 
honest. I probably should be able to, but I am not the chairman of the remuneration committee 
anymore.”  At least in New Zealand, codes of practice appear to be a reflection of other codes from 
around the world and what issuers of the codes perceive to be best practice.  In other words, 
normative pressure is weak.  Mimetic pressure is far stronger as non-executive directors are 
concerned with how their peers are remunerating executives.  Consultants reinforce this mimetic 
pressure by providing non-executive directors with intelligence on what their peers are doing.
Mimetic pressure has lead to remuneration committees in New Zealand publicly listed companies 
having processes and structures.  All of the companies except one, which the non-executive 
directors had been involved with, employed remuneration consultants to gather intelligence on their 
peers.  All of the companies had similar processes for setting and reviewing executive 
remuneration.  All of the companies remunerated their executives with a mix of salary, STI (mainly 
based on financial performance), and LTI (mainly based on share price performance).  The 
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interviewees viewed these processes and structures as taken-for-granted.  These processes and 
structured are reproduced because the interviewees used the same set of remuneration rationales, 
particularly market, consultant, human resources, responsibility, fairness, motivation, pay-for-
performance, and agency.  Non-executive directors believed that in applying these remuneration 
rationales they are able to maximise shareholder value.  They argue that the aforementioned 
processes and structures are rational and logical.  However, non-executive directors do 
acknowledge that their decision-making is constrained by societal expectations, particularly those 
of shareholders.  Therefore, the decision-making of remuneration committees is both rational and 
rule-based (Cyert and March, 1992; Olsen and March, 2006).
While mimetic pressure has reduced variation in the processes and structures that constitute 
executive remuneration, change is continual.  All non-executive directors commented on the trend 
from mainly fixed pay to mainly variable pay, and the increasing disclosure requirements.  Further, 
some companies want to known the leaders in best practice and disclosure, so they follow 
international trends in executive remuneration.  Some interviewees commented that New Zealand 
follows Australia, who follows the UK and US.  This process of institutional change is leading to the 
convergence of best practice (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010).  External events such as the global 
financial crisis can also lead to institutional change as organisations and actors have to adapt to 
changing economic and political environments (Greenwood et al., 2002).  For example, one 
consultant commented that, “[during] the Global Financial Crisis is the first time that people have 
taken pay reductions… that is once in a hundred years.” However, this research has not studied 
how the process of institutional change occurs, particularly in terms of institutional logic.  
7. Conclusion
Executives and non-executive directors draw on remuneration rationales to legitimise their 
companies’ executive remuneration practices.  The remuneration rationales are: agency, 
consultant, fairness, human resources, market, motivation, pay-for-performance, and responsibility.  
As these rationales are all legitimate, non-executive directors have a lot of flexibility in deciding 
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how and how much to remunerate executives.  However, the human resource and market 
rationales dominate the discourse of non-executive directors.  These rationales form part of the 
corporate logic, which assumes that non-executive directors have expert knowledge in how to 
remunerate executives.  The market rationale forms part of corporate logic, rather than agency 
logic because the market for managerial talent is controlled by non-executive directors, who are 
former executives and advisors to executives, rather than shareholders. While Zajac and Westphal 
(1995; 2004) found that US companies have transitioned from corporate to agency logic, this study 
shows that while New Zealand companies draw on both logics, the corporate logic is dominant.  
A theoretical framework is developed in this research (see figure 1) to explain how institutional 
logic and institutions influence organisational decision-making.  Organisations are both enabled 
and constrained by institutional logics and institutions.  The findings show that mimetic pressure, 
embodied in the market and consultant rationales, has led companies to imitate their peers.  The 
corporate logic is embedded in the beliefs and thinking of non-executive directors through their 
experiences and the opinions of others.  The agency logic is also embedded in the discourse on 
executive remuneration. However, some interviewees suggested that the agency rationale and 
LTIs are used symbolically to appease shareholders, while simultaneously raising the level of 
remuneration to what executives perceive to be competitive.  Again, the corporate logic dominates 
the discourse on executive remuneration.  While the findings explain why organisational decision-
making reproduces existing structures and processes, it does not explain how the corporate logic 
become to dominant the discourse on executive remuneration, and whether there will be a move 
towards the  agency logic in the future.  
The findings show that non-executive directors have much discretion in determining executive 
remuneration.  The executives and non-executives directors interviewed certainly believe that they 
are trustworthy and act in the best interests of companies.  They often said that maximising 
shareholder value in the long-term is their main objective.  However, the awareness of codes of 
practice such as those issued by the Securities Commission, Institute of Directors, New Zealand 
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Shareholders’ Association, and Minter Ellison is limited.  Also, dominance of the market rationale 
can lead to upward pressure on executive remuneration because it is set at the median to upper-
quartile level.  Non-executive directors did not believe that their executives are below average 
performers, yet some executives are by definition.  To overcome these problems and others 
described in the paper, regulators could consider adopting a mandatory code of practice.  But the 
code need not be prescriptive, as both Australia and the UK have ‘comply or explain’ approaches, 
which allows companies to vary from the code as long as they explain why.  
The main limitation of this research is that executive remuneration has not been quantitatively 
studied.  The remuneration rationales postulate how and how much executives should be 
remunerated.  Similarly, the interviewees often expressed opposing arguments, which they 
suspected to be true.  For example, the market and consultant rationales lead to upward pressure 
on the level of remuneration.  Future research should study the empirical validity of these 
arguments.  This research explains the pay-for-performance paradox; that is, why is there no 
economically significant relationship between CEO pay and firm performance when the vast 
majority of firms have a policy of pay-for-performance?  The dominance of the market rationale 
trumps the pay-for-performance rationale, as total remuneration must always be median or above.  
However, future research is needed to empirical test this argument.  
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